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ABSTRACT 
In order to become aware of inconsistencies, one must first construe of the world in a way that 
reflects its consistencies. This paper begins with a tentative model for how a set of discrete 
memories transforms into an interconnected worldview wherein relationships between memories 
are forged by way of abstractions. Inconsistencies prompt the invention of new abstractions. In 
regions of the conceptual network where inconsistencies abound, a cognitive analog of simulated 
annealing is in order; there is a willingness to question previous assumptions—to ‘loosen’ 
conceptual relationships—so as to let new concepts thoroughly percolate through the worldview 
and exert the needed revolutionary effect. In so doing there is a risk of assimilating dangerous 
concepts. Repression arrests the process by which dangerous thoughts infiltrate the conceptual 
network, and deception blocks thoughts that have already been assimilated. These forms of self-
initiated worldview inconsistency may evoke feelings of fragmentation at the level of the 
individual or the society. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This volume addresses the question of how we detect and cope with worldview inconsistencies. The present 
paper will explore how inconsistencies promote abstractions that resolve them, and that sometimes 
percolate through the worldview and reconfigure it. But perhaps it is appropriate to begin by backing up to 
consider a more basic question: how is it that the human mind is aware of consistencies in its world? This 
is, in fact, no small feat. The primate mind, for example, is incapable of linking concepts together in a chain 
of associations and thereby determining the degree to which they are consistent or inconsistent; it makes no 
attempt to stitch together strands of experience to create a coherent internal model of the fabric of reality. 
There is much evidence that this proclivity came into existence with the arrival of Homo erectus 
approximately 1.7 million years ago (Donald 1991). Section Two outlines a model of how this cognitive 
transition may have occurred. Since the model is presented in detail elsewhere (Gabora, 1998) it is 
explained here only insofar as is necessary to make sense of the material that follows.  
Armed with an idea of how we forge and incrementally elaborate a more or less consistent internal model 
of the world, we are in a better position to understand what happens when inconsistencies are encountered. 
Section Three discusses how we ‘patch holes’ in our worldview by inventing abstractions, and how 
	   2 
formidable inconsistencies prompt us to ‘unravel and reweave’, a process that can be modeled using a 
cognitive analog of simulated annealing.  
Section Four deals with worldview inconsistencies that we introduce voluntarily (albeit often 
unconsciously) through censorship, repression, and deception. Censorship artificially curtails the process by 
which a new experience or idea gets woven into the individual’s conceptual web. Deception perpetuates 
more deception, much as a fold tends to perpetuate itself along a length of fabric. These processes are less 
like to manifest as logical paradoxes than as generalized feelings of fragmentation.  
Section Five takes a closer look at the ‘worldview as tapestry’ metaphor that has been developed in the 
previous sections, and attempts to tie the paper together, so to speak, by clarifying this metaphor. 
The paper is speculative, heavier on theory than data (to say the least), so it won’t be everyone’s cup of tea. 
My goal in writing it was to express some provocative, interdisciplinary ideas that would round out this 
volume with a cognitive science perspective. 
 
2. WEAVING DISCRETE MEMORIES INTO A COHERENT 
WORLDVIEW  
2.1 A Transition in Cognitive Capacity 
The early human memory system appears to have been, like that of a primate, limited to the storage and 
cued retrieval of specific episodes (see Heyes, 1998). Accordingly, Donald (1991) uses the term episodic to 
designate a mind such as this that consists only of episodic memories, no abstractions. The awareness of an 
episodic mind is dominated by the events of the present moment. Occasionally it encounters a stimulus that 
is similar enough to some stored episode to evoke a retrieval or reminding event, and sometimes the 
stimulus evokes a reflexive, or (with much training) learned response. However, it has great difficulty 
accessing memories independent of environmental cues. It can not manipulate symbols and abstractions, or 
invent them on its own, and is unable to improve skills through self-cued rehearsal. It seems to encode each 
item as a separate, self-contained, unmodifiable entity. 
In contrast, the modern human mind encodes relationships between episodes by way of abstractions, and 
relates abstractions to one another by way of higher-order abstractions. For example, we know that the 
experience of seeing Rover was similar to the experience of seeing Lassie because Rover and Lassie are 
both instances of ‘dog’, and we know that dogs are animals. The human mind can retrieve and recursively 
operate on memories independent of environmental cues, a process referred to by Karmiloff-Smith (1992) 
as representational redescription. By redescribing an episode in terms of what is already known, it gets 
rooted in the network of understandings that comprise the worldview, and in turn, the worldview is 
perpetually revised as new experiences are assimilated and new symbols and abstract concepts invented as 
needed. The capacity for a self-sustained stream of thought that both structures and is structured by an 
internal model of the world enables us to plan and predict, to generate novelty, to tailor behavior according 
to context, and to exert precise control over intentional communication.  
The existence of this uniquely human form of cognition leaves us with a nontrivial question of origins. 
What sort of functional reorganization would turn an episodic mind into that of a modern human? In the 
absence of representational redescription, how are relationships established such that the memory turns into 
a vast, interwoven conceptual web? And until a memory incorporates relationships, how can one idea 
evoke another, which evokes another, et cetera, in a stream of representational redescription? In other 
words, if you need a worldview to generate a stream of thought, and streams of thought are necessary to 
connect knowledge into a worldview, how could one have come into existence without the other? We have 
a chicken-and-egg problem.  
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The explanation proposed here was inspired by an idea put forward to explain the origin of life. The origin 
of life and the origin of the cognitive dynamics underlying culture might appear at first glance to be very 
different problems. However, deep down, they both amount to the same thing: the bootstrapping of a 
system by which information patterns are generated, and the selective proliferation of some variants of 
these patterns over others (Dawkins 1975; Gabora 1997). Thus culture, like biology, can be viewed as a 
form of evolution, altbeit one that manifests very differently from biological evolution. Imitation and 
learning constitute the replication phase of this form of evolution, and creativity is the variation-generating 
phase. In keeping with this evolutionary framework, the term ‘meme’ is used to refer to a unit of cultural 
information as it is represented in the brain. Thus we take a broad interpretation of the meme concept. A 
meme can be anything from an idea for a recipe, to a memory of one’s uncle, to a concept of size, to an 
attitude of racial prejudice. Episodic memories and symbolic abstractions are memes, as is any element 
rational or irrational, conscious or unconscious, that constitutes a component of a worldview. The rationale 
for lumping together these diverse elements is that they are all ‘food for thought’, units of information that 
can be drawn upon to invent new memes or to clarify relationships amongst existing ones. Memes that have 
been implemented as actions, vocalizations, or objects are referred to as artifacts. The memes that dwell in 
the mind of an individual ‘host’ work together to build the illusion of a cohesive worldview and unified 
ego, yet compete for attention to get expressed as words, actions, or objects in the physical world.  
2.2 The Autocatalytic Theory of the Origin of Life 
We will put the aside the origin of worldviews and culture for now, and turn to the question of biological 
origins. The origin of life paradox can be stated simply: if living things come into existence when other 
living things give birth to them, how did the first living thing arise? That is, how did something complex 
enough to reproduce itself come to be? In biology, self-replication is orchestrated through an intricate 
network of interactions between DNA, RNA, and proteins. DNA is the genetic code; it contains instructions 
for how to construct various proteins. Proteins, in turn, both catalyze reactions that orchestrate the decoding 
of DNA by RNA, and are used to construct a body to house and protect all this self-replication machinery. 
Once again, we have a chicken-and-egg problem. If proteins are made by decoding DNA, and DNA 
requires the catalytic action of proteins to be decoded, which came first? How could a system composed of 
complex, mutually dependent parts come into existence? 
Kauffman (1991) suggested that once you have some sort of self-replicating structure in place, anything 
whatsoever that accomplishes this basic feat, natural selection can enter the picture and help things along. 
Accordingly, he decided to focus on how to get from no life at all to any kind of primitive self-replicating 
system, and hand the problem of getting from there to DNA-based life, over to natural selection (as well as 
self-organizing processes). Given the conditions present on earth at the time life began, how might some 
sort of self-replicating system have arisen? His answer is that life may have begun not with a single 
molecule capable of replicating itself, but with a set of collectively self-replicating molecules. That is, none 
of the molecules could replicate itself, but each molecule could induce the replication of some other 
molecule in the set, and likewise, its own replication was induced by some other member of the set. This 
kind of dual role as both ingredient (or stimulant) and product of different chemical reactions is not 
uncommon for polymers such as protein and RNA molecules. 
Polymers induce each other’s replication by acting as catalysts. Catalysts speed up chemical reactions that 
would otherwise occur very slowly. An autocatalytic system is a set of molecules which, as a group, 
catalyze their own replication. Thus if A catalyzes the conversion of X to B, and B catalyzes the conversion 
of Y to A, then A + B comprise an autocatalytic set (FIGURE 1). In an environment rich in X and Y, A + B 
can self-replicate. A set of polymers wherein each molecule’s formation is catalyzed by some other 
molecule is said to exhibit catalytic closure.  
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FIGURE 1. An autocatalytic set: A catalyses the formation of B, and B catalyses the formation of 
A. Thick black arrows represent catalyzed reactions. Thin green arrows represent catalysis.  
It is of course highly unlikely that two polymers A and B that just happened to bump into one another 
would happen to catalyze each other. However, this is more likely than the existence of a single polymer 
catalyzing its own replication. And in fact, when polymers interact, their diversity increases, and so does 
the probability that some subset of the total reaches a critical point where there is a catalytic pathway to 
every member. To show that this is true we must show that R, the number of reactions by which they can 
interconvert increases faster than N, their total number. So long as this is true, then if each reaction has 
some probability of getting carried out, the system eventually undergoes a sharp transition to a state where 
there is a catalytic pathway to each polymer present. We find that R/N does indeed increase. For the 
mathematical details, refer to (Kauffman 1993) or my summary in (Gabora, 1998).  
This kind of sharp phase transition is a statistical property of random graphs and related systems such as 
this one. Random graphs consist of dots, or ‘nodes’, connected to each other by lines or ‘edges’. As the 
ratio of edges to nodes increases, the probability that any one node is part of a chain of connected nodes 
increases, and chains of connected nodes become longer. When this ratio reaches approximately 0.5, almost 
all these short segments become cross-connected to form one giant cluster (FIGURE 4). Plotting the size of 
the largest cluster versus the ratio of edges to nodes yields a sigmoidal curve. The larger the number of 
nodes, the steeper the vertical portion of this curve (referred to as the percolation threshold).  
 
FIGURE 2. When the ratio of edges to nodes reaches approximately 0.5, short segments of 
connected nodes join to form a large cluster that encompasses the vast majority of nodes. 
	   5 
Of course, even if catalytic closure is theoretically possible, we are still a long way from knowing that it is 
the correct explanation for the origin of life. How likely is it that an autocatalytic set would have emerged 
given the particular concentrations of chemicals and atmospheric conditions present at the time life began? 
In particular, some subset of the R theoretically possible reactions may be physically impossible; how can 
we be sure that every step in the synthesis of each member of an autocatalytic set will actually get 
catalyzed? Kauffman’s response is: if we can show that autocatalytic sets emerge for a wide range of 
hypothetical chemistries—i.e., different collections of catalytic molecules—then the particular details of the 
chemistry that produced life do not matter so long as it falls within this range. We begin by noting that, 
much as several different keys sometimes open the same door, each reaction can be catalyzed by, not a 
single catalyst but a hypersphere of catalytic molecules, with varying degrees of efficiency. So we assign 
each polymer an extremely low a priori random probability P of catalyzing each reaction. The lower the 
value of P, the greater M must be, and vice versa. Kauffman shows that the values for M and P necessary to 
achieve catalytic closure with a probability of > 0.999 are highly plausible given the conditions of early 
earth. Experimental evidence for this theory using real chemistries (Lee et al. 1996, 1997; Severin et al. 
1997), and computer simulations (Farmer et al. 1986) have been unequivocally supportive. Farmer et al. 
showed that in an ‘artificial soup’ of information strings capable of cleavage and ligation reactions, 
autocatalytic sets do indeed arise for a wide range of values of M and P. FIGURE 3 shows an example of 
one of the simplest autocatalytic sets it produced. The original polymers from which an autocatalytic set 
emerges is referred to as the ‘food set’. In this case it consists of 0, 00, 1, and 11. As it happens, the 
autocatalytic set that eventually emerges contains all members of the original food set. This isn’t always the 
case.  
 
Figure 3. A typical example of a small autocatalytic set. Reactions are represented by thin, black 
lines connecting ligated polymers to their cleavage products. Thick, green lines indicate catalysts. 
Dark ovals represent food set. 
An interesting question explored in this simulation is: once a set of polymers has achieved autocatalytic 
closure, does that set remain fixed, or is it able to incorporate new polymer species? They found that some 
sets were subcritical—unable to incorporate new polymers—and others were supracritical—incorporated 
new polymers with each round of replication. Which of these two regimes a particular set fell into 
depended on P, and the maximum length of the food set polymers.  
Now the question is: supposing an autocatalytic set did emerge, how would it evolve? The answer is fairly 
straightforward. It is commonly believed that the primitive self-replicating system was enclosed in a small 
volume (such as a coascervate or liposome) to permit the necessary concentration of reactions (Oparin 
1971; Morowitz 1992; Cemin & Smolin, in press). Since each molecule is getting duplicated somewhere in 
	   6 
the set, eventually multiple copies of all molecules exist. The abundance of new molecules exerts pressure 
on the vesicle walls. This often causes such vesicles to engage in a process called budding, where it pinches 
off and divides into two ‘twins’. So long as each twin contains at least one copy of each kind of molecule, 
the set can continue to self-replicate indefinitely. Replication is far from perfect, so an ‘offspring’ is 
unlikely to be identical to its ‘parent’. Different chance encounters of molecules, or differences in their 
relative concentrations, or the arrival of new ‘food’ molecules, could all result in different catalysts 
catalyzing a given reaction, which in turn alters the set of reactions to be catalyzed. So there is plenty of 
room for heritable variation. Selective pressure is provided by the affordances and limitations of the 
environment. For example, say an autocatalytic set of RNA-like polymers arose. Some of its offspring 
might have a tendency to attach small molecules such as amino acids (the building blocks from which 
proteins are made) to their surfaces. Some of these attachments inhibit replication, and are selected against, 
while others favor it, and are selected for. We now have the beginnings of the kind of genotype-phenotype 
distinction seen in present-day life. That is, we have our first indication of a division of labor between the 
part of the organism concerned with replication (in this case the RNA) and the part that interacts with the 
environment (the proteins). 
The autocatalysis origin of life theory circumvents the ‘chicken-and-egg’ problem by positing that the same 
collective entity is both code and decoder. This entity doesn’t look like a code in the traditional sense 
because it is a code not by design but by default. The code is embodied in the physical structures of the 
molecules; their shapes and charges endow them with propensities to react with or ‘mutually decode’ one 
another such that they manifest external structure, in this case a copy of its ‘collective self’.  
2.3 Autocatalytic Closure in a Cognitive System 
We have considered two paradoxes’the origin of the psychological foundations of culture, and the origin of 
life’which from hereon will be referred to as OOC and OOL respectively. The parallels between them are 
intriguing. In each case we have a system composed of complex, mutually interdependent parts, and since it 
is not obvious how either part could have arisen without the other, it is an enigma how the system came to 
exist. In both cases, one of the two components is a storehouse of encoded information about a self in the 
context of an environment. In the OOL, DNA encodes instructions for the construction of a body that is 
likely to survive in an environment like that its ancestors survived. In the OOC, an internal model of the 
world encodes information about the self, the environment, and the relationships between them. In both 
cases, decoding a segment of this information storehouse generates another class of information unit that 
coordinates how the storehouse itself gets decoded. Decoding DNA generates proteins that orchestrate the 
decoding of DNA. Retrieving a memory or concept from the worldview and bringing it into awareness 
generates an instant of experience, a meme, which in turn determines which are the relevant portion(s) of 
the worldview to be retrieved to generate the next instant of experience. For example, if you had the 
thought ‘my baby seems to have measles’, you might rack your brain to see what you know about measles. 
The bottleneck in the OOC seems to be the establishment of a network of inter-related memes, a 
worldview, that progressively shapes and is shaped by a stream of self-triggered thought. We want to 
determine how such a complex entity might come to be. Donald (1991) claims that the transition from 
episodic to cultural culture "would have required a fundamental change in the way the brain operates." 
Drawing from the OOL scenario presented above, we will posit that meme evolution begins with the 
emergence of a collective autocatalytic entity that acts as both code and decoder.  
In the OOL case we asked: what was lying around on the primitive earth with the potential to form some 
sort of self-replicating system? The most promising candidate was catalytic polymers, the molecular 
constituents of either protein or RNA. Here we ask an analogous question: what sort of information unit 
does the episodic mind have at its disposal? It has memes, specifically memories of episodes. Episodic 
memes then constitute the ‘food set’ of our system. 
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Next we ask: what happens to the ‘food set’ to turn it into a self-replicating system? In the OOL case, food 
set molecules catalyzed reactions on each other that increased their joint complexity, eventually 
transforming some subset of themselves into a collective web for which there existed a catalytic pathway to 
the formation of each member molecule. I propose that an analogous process transforms an episodic mind 
into a culture-evolving one. Food set memes activate redescriptions of each other that increase their joint 
complexity, eventually transforming some subset of themselves into a collective web for which there exists 
a retrieval pathway to the formation of each member meme. Much as polymer A brings polymer B into 
existence by catalyzing its formation, meme A brings meme B into conscious awareness by retrieving it 
from memory. Note that a ‘retrieval’ can be reminding, a redescription of something in light of new 
contextual information, or a creative blend or reconstruction of many stored memes. 
We know that the brains of some prehistoric tribe somehow turned into instruments for the variation, 
selection, and replication of memes. How might Barney, a member of this tribe, have differed from his 
ancestors such that he was able to initiate this kind of transformation? To answer this question, we need to 
briefly summon what we have learned from the neurobiology and artificial intelligence, and build a best-
guess model of human cognition.  
The first thing to note is that memory is sparse. Where n is the number of features the senses can 
distinguish, N, the number of memes that could potentially be hosted by the focus = 2n for boolean 
variables (and it is infinitely large for continuous variables). For example, if n =1,000, N = 21,000 memes. 
Since assuming n is large, N is enormous, so the number of locations L where memes can be stored is only 
a small fraction of the N perceivable memes. The number of different memes actually stored at a given 
time, s, is constrained by L, as well as by the variety of perceptual experience, and the fact that meme 
retrieval, though distributed at the storage end, is serial at the awareness end. That is, the rate at which 
streams of thought reorganize the network is limited by the fact that everything is funneled through an 
awareness/attention mechanism; we can only figure one thing out at a time. In fact the difference between s 
and N is even greater since the mind rarely if ever attends all the stimulus dimensions it is capable of 
detecting.  
The set of all possible n-dimensional memes a mind is capable of storing can be represented as the set of 
vertices (if features assume only binary values) or points (if features assume continuous values) in an n-
dimensional hypercube, where the s stored memes occupy some subset of these points. The distance 
between two points in this space is a measure of how dissimilar they are, referred to as the Hamming 
distance. Kanerva (1988) makes some astute observations about this memory space. The number of memes 
at Hamming distance d away from any given meme is equal to the binomial coefficient of n and d, which is 
well approximated by a Gaussian distribution. Thus if meme X is 111...1 and its antipode is 000...0, and we 
consider meme X and its antipode to be the ‘poles’ of the hypersphere, then approximately 68% of the other 
memes lie within one standard deviation (sqrt(n)) of the ‘equator’ region between these two extremes 
(FIGURE 4). As we move through Hamming space away from the equator toward either Meme X or its 
antipode, the probability of encountering a meme falls off sharply by the proportion sqrt(n)/n.  
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FIGURE 4. Solid black curve is a schematic distribution of the Hamming distances from address 
of a given meme to addresses of other memory locations in a sparse memory. The Gaussian 
distribution arises because there are many more ways of sharing an intermediate number of 
features than there are of being extremely similar or different. A computer memory stores each 
item in only the left-most address, whereas a distributed network stores it throughout the network. 
A restricted activation function, such as the radial basis function, is intermediate between these 
two extremes. Activation decreases with distance from the ideal address, as indicated by grey 
shading. 
In a sparse memory, the probability that a meme one encounters is identical to one stored in memory is 
virtually zero. Therefore, retrieval should be impossible. In a neural network’a computer architecture 
inspired by how brains learn and retrieve information’this problem is solved by distributing the storage of a 
meme across many locations. Likewise, each location participates in the storage of many memes. The 
object of attention is represented as input/output nodes, memory locations as hidden nodes, and their 
pattern of connectivity as weighted links. An input touches off a pattern of activation which spreads 
through the network until it relaxes into a stable configuration, or achieves the desired input-output 
mapping using a learning algorithm. The output vector is determined through linear summation of weighted 
inputs. Thus a retrieved meme is not activated from a dormant state, but ‘reconstructed’.  
How can such a network avoid interference amongst the stored patterns? By restricting the distributed 
activation (as in a radial basis function). Recall that in the OOL case, it was crucial that the polymers be 
catalytic. We gave each polymer a small, random probability P of catalyzing each reaction. Here we do 
something similar. A hypersphere of locations is activated, such that activation is maximal at the center and 
tapers off in all directions according to a Gaussian distribution (see FIGURE 4). The lower the neuron 
activation threshold, the wider this distribution, and therefore the more memes are activated in response to 
any given meme. Another way the mind prevents interference is by being modular; that is, different regions 
of the brain specialize in the processing of different kinds of information. 
The final feature we will note about the brain is that it is content-addressable. That is, there is a 
correspondence between the location where a meme is stored and its semantic content. Thus each meme 
can only evoke, or activate, other memes that are similar to it. For example, when considering the problem 
of having to get out of your car every day to open the garage door, you would not think about doilies or 
existentialism, but concepts related to the problem—electricity, human laziness, and various openers you 
have encountered before.  
Let us now consider what would happen if, due to some genetic mutation, Barney’s activation threshold 
were significantly lower than average for his tribe. This means that a greater diversity of memes are 
activated in response to a given experience, and a larger portion of the contents of memory merge and 
surface to awareness in the next instant. When meme X goes fishing in memory for meme X', sooner or 
later this large hypersphere is bound to ‘catch’ a stored meme that is quite unlike X. For example, since 
Barney sees the sun every day, there are lots of ‘sun-dominated episodes’ stored in his brain. For simplicity, 
let us say they consist of a sequence of ten 0’s followed by a five bit long variable sequence. One night he 
looks up into the heavens and sees the Evening Star, which gets represented in his focus as 
000000011101010. This Evening Star episode will be referred to as meme X. Because the hypersphere is 
wide, all of the sun memories lie close enough to meme X to get evoked in the construction of X' (as is X 
itself). Since all the components from which X' is made begin with a string of seven zeros, there is no 
question that X' also begins with a string of seven zeros. These positions might code for features such as 
‘appears in sky’, ‘luminous’, et cetera. The following set of three 1s in the ‘sun’ memes are canceled out by 
the 0s in the ‘Evening Star’ meme, so in X' they are represented as *s. These positions might code for 
features such as ‘seen during the day’. The last five bits constituting the variable region are also statistically 
likely to cancel one another out. These code for other aspects of the experience, such as, say, the smell of 
food cooking or the sound of wind howling. So X' turns out to be the meme 0000000********, the generic 
category ‘heavenly body’, which then gets stored in memory in the next iteration. This evocation of 
‘heavenly body’ by the Evening Star episode isn’t much of a stream of thought, and it doesn’t bring Barney 
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much closer to an interconnected conceptual web, but it is an important milestone. It is the first time he 
ever derived a new meme from other memes, his first abstraction, his first creative act.  
Once ‘heavenly body’ has been evoked and stored in memory, the locations involved habituate and become 
refractory (so, for instance, ‘heavenly body’ does not recursively evoke ‘heavenly body’). However, 
locations storing memes that have some ‘heavenly body’ features, but that were not involved in the storage 
of ‘heavenly body’, are still active. ‘Heavenly body’ might activate ‘moon’ and then perhaps ‘cloud’ et 
cetera, thus strengthening associations between the abstract category and its instances. Other abstractions 
form in analogous fashion. As Barney accumulates both episodic memes and abstractions, the probability 
that any given attended meme is similar enough to some previously-stored meme to activate it increases. 
Therefore reminding acts increase in frequency, and eventually become streams of remindings, which get 
progressively longer. He is now capable of a train of thought. His memory is no longer just a waystation for 
coordinating stimuli with action; it is a forum for abstractive operations that emerge through the dynamics 
of iterative retrieval. 
How do we know that streams of thought will induce a phase transition to a critical state where for some 
subset of memes there exists a retrieval pathway to each meme in the subset? In the OOL case, we had to 
show that R, the number of reactions, increased faster than N, the number of polymers. Similarly, we now 
want to show that some subset of the memes stored in an individual’s mind inevitably reach a critical point 
where there is a path by which each meme in that subset can get evoked. But here, it is not reasonable to 
assume that all N perceivable memes actually exist (and can therefore partake in retrieval operations). The 
awareness/attention filter presents a bottleneck that has no analog in the OOL scenario. As a result, whereas 
OOL polymers underwent a sharp transition to a state of autocatalytic closure, any analogous transition in 
inter-meme relatedness is expected to take place gradually. So we need to show that R, the diversity of 
ways one meme can evoke another, increases faster than not N but s, the number of stored memes, i.e., 
memes that have made it through this bottleneck. That is, as the memory assimilates memes, it comes to 
have more ways of generating memes than the number of memes that have explicitly been stored in it.  
Under what conditions does that R increases faster than s? Once again the reader is referred to (Gabora 
1998) for the mathematical details. The key idea, however, is that abstraction increases s by creating a new 
meme, but it increases R more, because the more abstract the concept, the greater the number of memes a 
short Hamming distance away (since irrelevant dimensions make no contribution to Hamming distance). 
Second, as n starts to decrease the number of possible abstractions for each value of n increases (up to M/2, 
after which it starts to decrease). Taken together these points mean that lower-dimensional memes enable 
exponentially more retrieval paths. The more deeply a mind delves into lower-dimensional abstractions, the 
more the distribution in FIGURE 4 rises and becomes skewed to the left. So, whereas R increases as 
abstraction makes relationships increasingly explicit, s levels off as new experiences have to be 
increasingly unusual in order to count as new and get stored in a new constellation of locations. 
Furthermore, when the carrying capacity of the memory is reached, s plateaus, but R does not. Thus, as 
long as the neuron activation threshold is large enough to permit abstraction and small enough to permit 
temporal continuity, the average value of n decreases. Sooner or later the system is expected to reach a 
critical percolation threshold such that R increases exponentially faster than s, as in FIGURE 2. The 
memory becomes so densely packed that any meme that comes to occupy the focus is bound to be close 
enough in Hamming distance to some previously-stored meme(s) to evoke it. The memory (or some portion 
of it) is holographic, in the sense that there is a pathway of associations from any one meme to any other. 
Together they form an autocatalytic set. What was once just a collection of isolated memories is now a 
structured network of concepts, instances, and relationships—a worldview.  
Now that we have an autocatalytic network of memes, how does it self-replicate? In the OOL scenario, 
polymer molecules accumulate one by one until there are at least two copies of each, and their shell divides 
through budding to create a second replicant. In the OOC scenario, Barney shares concepts, ideas, stories, 
and experiences with his children and tribe members, spreading his worldview meme by meme. Categories 
he had to invent on his own are presented to and experienced by others much as any other episode. They 
are handed a shortcut to the category; they don’t have to engage in abstraction to obtain it. Recall how the 
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probability of autocatalysis in the OOL simulation could be increased by raising either the probability of 
catalysis or the number of polymers (since it varied exponentially with M). Something similar happens 
here. Even if Barney’s son Bambam has a higher neuron activation threshold than Barney, once he has 
assimilated enough of Barney’s abstractions, his memes become so densely packed that a version of 
Barney’s worldview snaps into place in his mind. Bambam shares his worldview with his friend Pebbles, 
who in turn shares it with the rest of the tribe. These different hosts expose their ‘copy’ of Barney’s original 
worldview to different experiences, different bodily constraints, and sculpt it into a unique internal model 
of the world. Small differences are amplified through positive feedback, transforming the space of viable 
worldview niches. Individuals whose activation threshold is too small to achieve worldview closure are at a 
reproductive disadvantage, and, over time, eliminated from the population. Eventually the proclivity for an 
ongoing stream of thought becomes so firmly entrenched that it takes devoted yogis years of meditation to 
even briefly arrest it.  
To sum up: Kauffman’s proposal that life originated with the self-organization of a set of autocatalytic 
polymers suggests a mechanism for how discrete memories become woven into a worldview. Much as 
catalysis increases the number of different polymers, which in turn increases the frequency of catalysis, 
reminding events increase meme density by triggering symbolic abstraction, which in turn increases the 
frequency of remindings. And just as catalytic polymers undergo a phase transition to a state where there is 
a catalytic pathway to each polymer present, and together they constitute a self-replicating set, memes 
undergo a phase transition to a state where each meme is retrievable through a pathway of 
remindings/associations. Together the memes now constitute a transmittable worldview, an internalized 
tapestry of reality, that both weaves, and is woven by, threads of experience. 
3. MENDING, PATCHING, AND REWEAVING  
3.1 Abstractions Both Create and Alleviate Worldview Inconsistencies 
It would seem that in the transition from the episodic mind to the culture evolving mind, we have made 
enormous progress. And in fact a worldview is enormously useful; with it we can imagine and evaluate the 
outcomes of various actions, compose music, and write articles about worldviews. It is tempting to think 
that our understanding of the world must be enormously more accurate than that of any other species. In 
fact, however, the episodic mind has no inconsistencies. Since it doesn’t represent relationships, it doesn’t 
get any relationships wrong. It never encoded the sun and the stars as different kinds of entities in the first 
place, so if it were to go further and further away from the sun until it looked just like any other star, no 
conceptual adjustment would have to be made. Thus there is a tradeoff between abstraction and accuracy.  
This tradeoff affects the accuracy of not only impersonal beliefs, but also items of a more personal nature. 
Although most papers in this volume deal with inconsistencies that take the form of logical fallacies, 
inconsistencies in the realm of self-perception and social cognition probably exert as large an effect. For 
example, ever since the concepts ‘good’ and ‘bad’ came into being, many people have simultaneously held 
(to some extent at least) both the beliefs ‘I am good’ and ‘I am bad’.  
As the horizon of a worldview push forward, and it gets pulled to cover more and more ground, inevitably 
holes appear that need to be mended. Sometimes just stretching an existing concept does the trick. For 
example, although sun and star were originally classified as different kinds of objects, they eventually came 
to be classified as instances of the same thing. Or sometimes the worldview needs a metaphor. An 
abstraction in another part of the ‘reality fabric’ is called in to patch things up, as in ‘The moon was a 
ghostly galleon’. Often the metaphor sticks, as in ‘sunny disposition’ or ‘star pupil’. In still other cases, an 
abstraction is newly-invented to do the job. For example, the concept ‘heavenly body’ was coined so that 
one might refer to any of the various objects that appear in the sky.  
3.2 Thought Trajectories and Attractors in a Cultural Fitness Landscape 
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Inconsistencies do not just manifest at random here and there in conceptual space. Since the culture-
evolving system grew out of, and is dependent on, the biology-evolving system, the most stable relationship 
between them is one of mutually-beneficial coeveolution. Since many, if not all, of our needs either have a 
biological basis (e.g., the need for food, for shelter, et cetera) or are derived from other needs that do (e.g., 
the need to make money), the generation of new memes is largely constrained by our heritage as products 
of biological evolution. Cultural trajectories do sometimes diverge from the ‘safest’ regions of conceptual 
space (e.g., the decision to commit suicide). These situations are unstable, caused by forces that work in 
opposition to the pull of the attractor. Thus another pitfall of having a worldview is that it occasionally 
leads its bearer astray from the actions that would most benefit it. You don’t need an interwoven worldview 
to seek food when you are hungry and to hide when you sense danger; stimulus-response associations do 
the job. Thus, much as a physical organism sometimes falls down when the impetus that sets a limb into 
motion ignores contextual input from the rest of the body, a worldview runs the risk of losing its 
‘conceptual center of balance’ when the thought trajectories it spawns stray far from basic human concerns. 
So worldviews tend to grow (and thus inconsistencies manifest) in regions of conceptual space that deal 
with human affairs.  
This brings us to the notion of a fitness landscape. Consider the vast space of possible memes discussed in 
Section 3. Some of them are more useful for a human than others. A fitness landscape is a measure of the 
relative value, or fitness, of each possibility given some set of constraints. Fitness landscapes are portrayed 
graphically by choosing two important dimensions and plotting them on the X and Z axes, and plotting 
fitness on the Y axis. Since points that have similar values for dimensions X and Z tend to have similar 
fitnesses (in other words, the landscape is correlated), fitness landscapes look like pieces of fabric, with 
rolling hills and valleys. Cultural landscapes are in a state of perpetual flux as one need gets satisfied and 
another takes precedence.  
We can think of a worldview as a region of conceptual space where, given the needs we routinely 
experience, our cultural trajectories tend to dwell. Our worldviews overlap to the extent that similar genetic 
heritage and experience invite similar cultural trajectories. But each person’s temperament and experience 
are different, so each person’s private worldview carves out a unique path through conceptual space. This is 
obvious when we engage in the subtle interplay of cultural exchange; everyone has a different personality, 
leaves us with a different ‘flavor’. One can think of a worldview as a personality as it is experienced from 
the inside. 
Abstractions are not only driven by the cultural fitness landscape, they feed back on and actually alter its 
topology. Much as the evolution of rabbits created ecological niches for species that eat them and parasitize 
them, the invention of cars created cultural niches for gas stations, seat belts, and garage door openers. As 
one progresses from infant-hood to maturity, and simple needs give way to increasingly complex needs, the 
trajectory of a stream of thought acquires the properties of a chaotic or strange attractor. The landscape is 
fractal (i.e., there is statistical similarity under change of scale) in that the satisfaction of one need creates 
other needs. This is analogous to the fractal distributions of species and vegetation patterns described by 
ecologists (Mandelbrot (60), Palmer (69), Scheuring & Riedi (83)).  
3.3 Multiple Layers of Abstraction 
In the OOL case, since short, simple molecules are more abundant and readily-formed than long, complex 
ones, it made sense to expect that the food set molecules were the shortest and simplest members of the 
autocatalytic set that eventually formed. Accordingly, in simulations of this process, the ‘direction’ of 
novelty generation is outward, joining less complex molecules to form more complex ones through AND 
operations (see FIGURE 5). In contrast, the elements of the cognitive “food set” are complex, consisting of 
all attended features of an episode. In order for them to form an interconnected web, their interactions tend 
to move in the opposite direction, starting with relatively complex memes and forming simpler, more 
abstract ones through OR operations. The net effect of the two is the same: a network emerges, and joint 
complexity increases. But what this means for the OOC is that there are numerous levels of autocatalytic 
closure, which convey varying degrees of worldview interconnectedness and consistency on their ‘meme 
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hosts’. These levels correspond to increased penetration of the (n-1, n-2’)-dimensional nested hypercubes 
implicit in an n-dimensional memory space. Since it is difficult to visualize the set of nested, 
multidimensional hypercubes, we will represent this structure as a set of concentric circles, such the outer 
skin of this onion-like structure represents the hypercube with all n dimensions, and deeper circles represent 
lower-dimensional hypercubes (FIGURE 5). Obviously, not all the nested hypercubes can be shown. The 
points of our original hypercube are represented as points along the perimeter of these circles, and the 
centermost location where a meme is stored is shown as a large, black dot.  
 
FIGURE 5. The role of abstractions in creative thought. For ease of visualization, the set of 
nested hypercubes representing the space of possible memes is shown as a set of concentric 
circles, where deeper circles store deeper layers of abstraction (lower dimensional hypercubes). 
A black dot represents the centermost storage location for a specific meme. ‘Heavenly body’ is a 
more general concept than ‘sun’ or ‘star’, and is therefore stored at a deeper layer of abstraction. 
Green circle around each stored meme represents hypersphere where the meme gets stored and 
from which the next meme is retrieved.  
The outermost shell encodes memes in whatever form they are in the first time they are consciously 
encountered. This is all the episodic mind has to work with. In order for one meme in this shell to evoke 
another, they have to be extremely similar at a superficial level. In a cultural mind, however, related 
concepts are within reach of one another because they are stored in overlapping hyperspheres.  
‘Sun’ and ‘star’ might be too far apart in Hamming distance for one to evoke the other directly. However, 
by attending the abstraction ‘Heavenly Body’, which ignores the ‘seen at night versus seen during the day’ 
distinction, the mind decreases the apparent Hamming distance between them.  
The most primitive level of autocatalytic closure is achieved when stored episodes are interconnected by 
way of abstractions just a few ‘onionskin layers’ deep, and streams of thought zigzag between these 
superficial layers. A second level occurs when relationships amongst these abstractions are identified by 
higher-order abstractions at deeper onionskin layers. Et cetera. Once an individual has defined an 
abstraction, identified its instances, and chunked them together in memory, she can manipulate the 
abstraction much as she would a concrete episode.  
Undoubtedly there is selective pressure for parents who monitor their child’s progress in abstraction and 
interact with the child in ways that promote the formation of new abstractions the next level up. Recall the 
discussion in Section 2 concerning the incorporation of new polymer species by supracritical autocatalytic 
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sets. This kind of parental guidance is analogous to handcrafting new polymers to be readily integrated into 
a particular autocatalytic set; in effect it keeps the child’s mind perpetually poised at a supracritical state.  
3. 4 Constraint Satisfaction and Cognitive Annealing 
Sometimes a new concept fits readily into the existing worldview and single-handedly resolves an 
inconsistency. Other times, the solution is not so simple. The canonical example is the pre-Copernican view 
of the universe; one discrepancy after another reared its ugly head. In situations like this, priorities must be 
re-evaluated, and abstractions that have long served us well must be discarded. An extensive portion of the 
worldview must be ripped apart and put back together in a new way.  
The development of a worldview that accurately portrays reality and effectively navigates us through the 
maze of human affairs is a good example of what computer scientists refer to as a multi-objective 
optimization or constraint satisfaction problem. In other words, it involves simultaneously maximizing or 
minimizing multiple frequently-conflicting criteria. This kind of problem is particularly difficult to solve 
because the trade-offs between the multiple objectives or constraints are often unknown. The best that can 
be done is to find a Pareto optimal solution’one that cannot be improved with respect to any one objective 
without worsening some other objective (Steuer, 1986). A compromise is reached.  
Simulated annealing is a mathematical technique for solving this kind of problem. It was inspired by the 
physical process of annealing, during which a metal is heated and then gradually cooled. The shapes and 
charges of the atoms confer on them varying degrees of attraction and repulsion toward one another. 
Configurations that maximize attractive forces and minimize repulsive ones are most stable; thus, the 
shapes and charges of the atoms define the constraints of the system. Heating decreases the stability of the 
forces that bind the atoms together’it loosens global structure’whereas cooling has the opposite effect. The 
slower the cooling process, the more opportunity the atoms have to settle into a stable, low-energy 
arrangement.  
Simulated annealing computationally mimics the cooling process by decreasing and then gradually 
increasing the stability of the connections amongst the parts of a system in a series of either random or 
deterministic updates. If there are too few update steps, the system settles on a state wherein few of the 
constraints imposed by the structure and dynamics of its components are met. It may, for example, result in 
islands of mutually compatible components which are themselves incompatible, in which case the system 
has difficulty functioning as a whole. The greater the number of updates, the more harmonious the state the 
system eventually settles into, i.e., the more likely it is to find a Pareto optimal solution. An interesting 
feature of this proces is that as the temperature is lowered, the correlation length’that is, how far apart the 
components of a system must be before their mutual information falls to zero’increases. Another way to say 
this is: the mutual information’the amount of information that can be gleaned about one component of a 
system by examining another component’increases. The result is that a perturbation to any one component 
can percolate through the system and affect even distant components. 
How does this pertain to worldviews? When inconsistencies spring up all over the place, simply 
assimilating a new concept or two is insufficient. Large-scale worldview renovation is in order. It seems 
reasonable to expect that when this happens there would be a tendency to temporarily ‘loosen’ one’s 
internal model of reality, weaken inter-meme relationships, so as to allow new insights to more readily 
percolate through and exert the needed revolutionary impact. Then one slowly ‘anneals’ as the details of 
how to best structure this new and improved worldview fall into place. This could be achieved by 
decreasing the neuron activation threshold’thus increasing the potential of any meme to trigger a chain 
reaction of novel associations’and then slowly increasing the threshold, thereby stabilizing associations that 
are consistent and fruitful. In fact, simulated annealing is sometimes used to improve the performance of a 
neural network (e.g., Cohen 1994; Cozzio 1995). 
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What sort of meme might be able to capitalize on this state of increased readiness, and trigger cognitive 
reorganization of this magnitude? Strong candidates include the logical operators ‘and’, ‘or’, and ‘not’. 
When a child first glimpses how these abstractions can be used to manipulate and invent symbols, the 
potential for dramatic reconfiguration and overall expansion of the conceptual network may well be greater 
than at any other time in his or her life. The assimilation of other particularly useful abstractions, such as 
‘mine’, ‘depth’, or ‘time’, as well as frames (Barsalou, in press), scripts (Schank & Abelson 1977), and 
schemas (Bartlett 1932, 1958; Piaget 1926, 1936/52; Minsky 1985) might also be expected to precipitate 
substantial worldview revamping.  
The phenomenon need not be limited to concepts we acquire as a child (although it seems reasonable to 
expect that the resolution and fidelity with which our worldview has been formed each step of the way 
constrains the number and magnitude of revisions it will later undergo). Science offers abundant potential 
for this. The more inconsistent an experimental result, the greater its potential to induce such a 
transformation. The fact that quantum mechanics defies complete integration into our worldview, for 
example, suggests that its transformation potential is great.  
Concepts that have the capacity to exert a dramatic effect are probably rare. Rosch’s (1978) work on basic 
level categories suggests that the way we develop abstractions and use them to organize information is not 
arbitrary but emerges in such a way as to maximize explanatory power. It would not be surprising to find 
that the relationship between concept frequency and degree of abstraction exhibits the same kind of power 
law relationship as one finds in other emergent systems (Bak, Tang, & Weisenfeld 1988).  
4. FLAWS AND FOLDS 
4.1 How Censorship Fragments the Worldview 
The process of conceptual re-annealing described above is expected to take place as a last resort only. 
Why? Because it makes the worldview vulnerable. It allows an alien element to deeply penetrate a 
workable system, with unforseen and potentially harmful consequences. Just as importing foreign plants 
can bring ecological disaster, assimilating a foreign meme can upset the established state of harmony in a 
conceptual network, thereby inviting confusion and depression.  
In fact, a child develops mental censors that ward off the internalization of potentially threatening memes 
(Minsky1985). This includes memes that have the potential to disrupt the belief structure (such as the idea 
of natural selection to a creationist) as well as memes that could damage the ego (such as the realization 
that you are ugly). It includes any meme that could in some way threaten survival (such as the realization 
that you don’t believe in the product your company produces, and a host of other memes that I can’t tell 
you about because my censors prohibit them).  
Censorship could easily be accomplished through a procedure opposite to that described in Section 3.3: 
temporarily increasing the activation threshold, and thereby prematurely terminating assimilation of the 
current contents of awareness into the conceptual network. The censored meme would then be isolated 
from the memory at large, much as are the episodic memes in a primate’s brain. Censoring a meme alters 
both the probability that it gets evoked (activated into awareness) by other memes, and the probabilities 
involved in determining which other memes are evoked by it once it has become active. It is like a portion 
of fabric that is fenced in on all sides by knots. Pulling on a fiber of the fabric outside the fenced region 
does not exert much of a pull on that fiber inside the fenced region, and vice versa; the knots dampen the 
force of the pull by diffusing it across the tangled mass of other fibers. Much as erecting a real fence 
increases the probability that people will stay on either one side or the other, the censored meme is either 
avoided, or dwelt on excessively. This is consistent with our bipolar attitude toward highly censored 
subjects such as aggression and sexuality, and seems to correspond closely to what psychiatrists refer to as 
altered schema valence, wherein specific topics elicit in the patient either latent valency (excessive 
avoidance), or hypervalency (excessive preoccupation) (Beck & Freeman 1990).  
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Extensive censoring is referred to as repression. Recall our discussion of simulated annealing, where we 
introduced the term correlation length. If the above line of reasoning is correct, repression lowers the 
mutual information and the average correlation length between memes. The individual is less able to 
respond spontaneously because contextual information takes longer to percolate through the network. This 
then sheds some light on how self-destructive memes might emerge. Much as it would be hard to stay 
physically balanced if the nerve endings from one of your legs were blocked, it is hard to stay 
psychologically balanced if significant portions of your conceptual network are fenced off. It also provides 
us with a relatively tangible interpretation of the common phrases ‘psychologically unstable’, ‘fragmented 
reality’ and ‘split personality’.  
These processes appear to take place not only at the level of an individual’s worldview, but also at the level 
of the collective worldview of a society. Once again we have a trade-off. This time it is between social 
mores that encourage free thinking and thereby risk the proliferation of potentially dangerous thought 
trajectories, and social mores that discourage free thinking, at the risk of increased repression and 
deception. 
4.2 How Deception Invites Worldview Distortion 
We have all felt at one time or another the strain of telling a lie, or of living a lie, as in by pretending to like 
someone we do not like. Once you lie, you never know what other ‘threads of reality’ will have to be drawn 
in to maintain consistency. For example, the cheating spouse says she was working late at the office. Her 
husband asks why she didn’t answer her office phone. She lies again and says that she was in her 
colleague’s office because her computer is broken. And so on.  
Whereas repression halts the assimilation process, deception blocks thoughts that have already been 
assimilated. Much as a fold in one part of a piece of fabric induces folding in adjacent regions, deception 
perpetuates more deception in nearby regions of conceptual space. The folded-over, hidden-from-view 
portion of the worldview is avoided, much as censored material is, with the ensuing fragmentation and loss 
of conceptual balance described above. 
Deception is widespread in not only humans (Mitchell & Thompson 1986), but also plants and animals 
(e.g., Dawkins 1982; Krebs & Dawkins 1984; Wallace 1973). By misleading others, the perpetrator of 
deception gains an unfair advantage. Some have argued that not only deception, but self-deception is 
adaptive, because it enables one to more convincingly deceive others (Alexander 1975, 1979; Trivers 1976, 
1985). As Trivers puts it, “there must be strong selection for a degree of self-deception, rendering some 
facts and motives so as not to betray—by the subtle signs of self-knowledge—the deception being 
practiced." He goes on to argue that if deception increases fitness, and self-deception increases ability to 
deceive, then: "the conventional view that natural selection favors nervous systems which produce ever 
more accurate images of the world must be a very naïve view of mental evolution." 
One might conclude that deception is an unavoidable feature of the human condition. When cognition is 
viewed as a constraint satisfaction problem, we see that this isn’t necessarily the case. Each individual’s 
worldview can be seen as a different solution to the often-conflicting demands of human survival. Our 
worldviews are constantly evolving as different approaches to life play themselves out in our various 
endeavors and interactions. Of course I may be deceiving myself, but it seems to me that if the ideas 
presented above hold any merit, the final word is not yet in as to whether deception will play a part in the 
most optimal solutions humanity eventually zeros in on.  
5. REFLECTIONS ON THE CONCEPTUAL TAPESTRY 
There is a web called Indra’s Net, made of threads of light. It stretches horizontally through 
space, and vertically through time. At every intersection dwells an individual, and at every 
individual lies a crystal bead of light.  
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--Buddhist allegory 
We have been developing a metaphor between the properties of an interconnected worldview and the 
properties of a piece of woven fabric. The metaphor has served to sharpen our intuitions about less tangible 
cognitive phenomena. From what sort of fibers might the conceptual web be woven from?  
One unusual property of memes is that they can readily and instantaneously combine with one another to 
create something new. Another unusual property of memes is their dual nature. The fabric of reality is 
continuously stretched, pulled back on itself, never the same. It can viewed as a set of interconnected 
memes, a perspective that focuses on the individual units of which it is composed. Alternatively it can be 
viewed as an emergent whole, a perspective that focuses on the undulations that run across its length as one 
thought after another rises to the foreground and falls back giving way to another. 
There is another substance that exhibits these properties, one that in fact has been used as an analog of 
cognition since the dawn of civilization, and that is light. The metaphor permeates our language still, as in: 
moment of illumination, he beamed, her face lit up, to glow with enthusiasm, flash of insight, ray of hope, 
dim-whitted person, light of my life, show me the light, et cetera. Let us then briefly explore whether this 
analogy can provide insight into the ideas we have been developing. 
5.1 Bending the Truth 
We will begin by addressing the issue of deception discussed in Section 4.2. When a beam of light passes 
from one medium to another perpendicular to the boundary between them, as in FIGURE 6a below, it 
passes straight through without refracting (bending). When the beam of light passes from one medium to 
another at any other angle, as in the figure below, it refracts. The greater the deviation from 90’, or the 
greater the difference in density between the two media, the greater the refraction (FIGURE 6b).  
 
Figure 6a. Light passing from one medium to another at an angle perpendicular to their boundary 
does not refract. 6b. Light passing from one medium to another at an angle that is not 
perpendicular to their boundary does refract. 
The light metaphor offers a speculative suggestion for why the proclivity to deceive others is highly 
correlated with a distorted perception of reality (as in neuroses) (Beck et al., 1990). If in FIGURE 6b above, 
the light from the less dense medium were projected back to the dense media, on this inward trip there 
would once again be refraction. Analogously, if one gets into the habit of orienting one’s thought 
trajectories such that thoughts come out distorted (for example, in order to more acceptable to others) then 
perhaps, if that orientation becomes habitual, things start coming in distorted. 
5.2 Focusing Attention and Reflecting on an Idea 
In fact, distortion is not confined to the situation wherein someone tells a lie; a more subtle form is inherent 
in all communication. The act of transforming a raw idea into words, gestures, notes, or even equations, 
necessarily distorts it. There is no way to avoid this kind of distortion, short of never expressing ideas. 
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Finding a way of expressing a meme that minimizes distortion while keeping the meaning intact takes time 
and effort.  
Once again, light exhibits an analogous behavior. When a wide beam passes through a concave surface, it 
becomes more diffuse, as in FIGURE 7a. This is because no matter what direction the beam is pointed, 
there is no way it can meet the surface at a perpendicular angle across its full width. Therefore the edges are 
forced to bend, or refract.  
 
  
Figure 7. A conceptual metaphor for (a) the distortion and decrease in intensity that takes place 
when a vague idea is expressed, and (b) the clarification and heightened intensity that occurs if 
the idea is first reflected upon.  
When a beam of light strikes a boundary between two media, it does not always pass through. Sometimes it 
reflects off the boundary surface back into the first media. When a diffuse beam of light is repeatedly 
reflected off a concave surface such as the interior of a sphere, it becomes more focused, as in FIGURE 7b. 
Similarly, when we reflect on an initially vague idea, it becomes more focused in our minds. Reflecting on 
an idea amounts to reflecting it back and forth off ‘onionskin layers’ of varying degrees of abstraction, 
refining it in the context of its various interpretations.  
5.3 Superficial and Deep Ideas 
Are all ideas equally prone to this kind of distortion? Let us return to the ‘layers of abstraction’ concept 
discussed in Section 3.3. Deep ideas, like the concept of opposite, or of depth itself, apply to almost any 
domain of life. Similarly, light that originates in the center of a sphere can radiate outward in any direction 
without refraction, because wherever it contacts the sphere it is perpendicular to it, as in FIGURE 8a.  
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Figure 8. A conceptual metaphor for (a) the ubiquitous applications for deep concepts versus (b) 
the domain-specific nature of superficial ones.  
Superficial ideas are relevant to only a narrow domain of life; they don’t translate well to some other 
subject matter. Once again we invoke a light metaphor. Light that originates near the surface of a sphere 
can only radiate through a narrow region without reflection and refraction. Thus in FIGURE 8a, when light 
hits the sphere at a perpendicular angle, as in Beam A, there is no refraction. If the angle is just a little bit 
off, as in Beam B, it refracts. Strangely enough, if it travels backwards as in Beam C (in the opposite 
direction to Beam A), there is once again no refraction. This concurs with the longstanding yet 
counterintuitive notion of unity in opposites. The fact that we are reaching a point in scientific history 
where interdisciplinary research is commonplace, and concepts that apply to all the sciences’such as chaos, 
fractal, attractor, and fitness landscape’are almost cliché (and quickly working their way into the 
layperson’s vocabulary), may be an indication that the scientific component of our worldview is 
approaching that innermost core of conceptual abstraction. (Of course if we code episodes at a higher 
resolution to begin with, even deeper levels of abstraction may await us’) 
It may be that these metaphors are useful only as conceptual tools. However it may be that the 
mathematical basis of the two phenomena may have much in common. If this is the case, we can expect 
them to provide one another with ‘conceptual scaffolding’, as do the concepts of biological and cultural 
evolution. Work is underway to investigate how deeply the correspondence goes. Since light has been used 
as a metaphor for cognition since the dawn of civilization, it would be very interesting these systems are 
found to be, at an abstract level of analysis, the same thing. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
We have looked at a tentative model to explain how an interconnected conceptual web, or worldview, could 
emerge from a collection of discrete episodic memories through the formation and progressive elaboration 
of abstractions, and the identification of relationships. We have seen that there is a cost to this 
transformation; without a worldview there are no inconsistencies. Inconsistencies can often be mended, or 
patched up with abstractions. But there is no guarantee that the human mind is capable of weaving its 
memories and abstractions into an entirely consistent construction, particularly given our tendencies toward 
repression and deception. Perhaps the ‘enlightened’ thing to shoot for is not a worldview that is particularly 
extensive, or even completely accurate, but one which unfolds in its own time while allowing us to 
maintain our conceptual center of balance. 
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